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Start-up subsidies are a frequently employed policy instrument, the use of which is justified 
by alleged market failure resulting from positive external effects and capital market 
imperfections. This article investigates whether the allocation of subsidies reflects a policy 
focus on addressing these market failure occurrences. However, using survey data from the 
East German state of Thuringia, logistic regressions reveal a rather random subsidization of 
start-ups. Furthermore, propensity score matching suggests that subsidized start-ups would 
have survived and thrived in any case, an indication of deadweight losses of start-up 
subsidies. The analysis points to serious information problems arising when subsidies should 
be allocated to remedy market failure. Making the situation even more problematic is that 
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Entrepreneurship plays an increasingly prominent role in both academic and policy circles. It 
is regarded as the driving force behind structural change that links investments in knowledge 
with economic growth (Audretsch and Thurik, 2001). The increased role of new and small 
enterprises has led to an increase in entrepreneurship policies aimed at encouraging more 
people to consider entrepreneurship as an option and act on a business idea (Lundström and 
Stevenson, 2005). Especially in East Germany, which still lags behind West Germany in all 
economic performance indicators, policymakers pin their hopes on various policy instruments 
(Bundesregierung, 2007). Although entrepreneurship policies focus on soft policy instruments 
like consulting services, the overall subsidy environment is dominated by soft loans, loan 
guarantees, and grants—offering start-ups an extensive choice of support (Thüringer 
Aufbaubank, 2008). The policy focus on hard policy instruments is also reflected in the 
allocation of public funds. For example, although 5.3 million Euro were allocated to public 
initiatives offering consulting services to Thuringian business founders in 2005 and 2006, 
direct financial subsidies for business set-ups in Thuringia amounted to more than 104 million 
Euro during that same period (TMWTA, 2007).
1
Traditionally, policy intervention in favor of nascent and young entrepreneurs and 
their start-ups is justified by presumed market failure. First, positive externalities accruing 
from entrepreneurship create a disparity in the valuation of (potential) entrepreneurs by 
investors and policymakers (Audretsch et al., 2007). Whereas individual entrepreneurs and 
investors are only interested in single firm performance, policymakers should be more 
interested to allow for positive external effects. Second, policy intervention aims at remedying 
asymmetric information, which has been argued to restrict young and small firms’ access to 
capital and thus hinder entrepreneurial performance (van Praag et al., 2005). Start-ups differ 
in both their ex-ante characteristics, such as economic and environmental features, and by the 
individual characteristics of their founders and, therefore, capital constraints will also vary 
(Blumberg and Letterie, 2008). Similarly, positive external effects do not accrue from every 
entrepreneurial project (Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007; Fritsch and Schroeter, 2009). 
The identification of market failures that hamper the start-up and growth of otherwise 
efficient ventures is thus a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective and efficient 
                                                 
1 The latter figure comprises only those funds from the Gemeinschaftsaufgabe „Verbesserung der regionalen 
Wirtschaftsstruktur” (GA) (TMWTA, 2007), which are allocated for genuine business start-ups and for setting 
up new branches of existing businesses. Although the GA is the most important scheme of German regional 
policy, there are other programs that offer soft loans, loan guarantees, and grants to Thuringian start-ups 
(TMWTA, 2007; Thüringer Aufbaubank, 2008). 
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the market distortions that can result from subsidization. Market distortions arise because 
policymakers and program officials do not have complete information which would allow to 
fund marginal projects. In the absence of complete information, public support schemes give 
subsidized start-ups an artificial competitive edge that could lead to their substitution for other 
start-ups or incumbents that are ex-ante more efficient but nonsubsidized. In general, the 
distortions arising from substitution effects are larger than those resulting from deadweight 
losses: not only is public money spent ineffectively, but the subsidy enables the subsidized 
start-up to crowd out a potentially more efficient firm (Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). 
The start-up subsidy environment is diverse. Various subsidization policies coexist, 
leading to a broad range of support schemes administered by a similarly broad range of 
agencies (TMWTA, 2007). In this study, I do not examine a specific scheme but take an 
aggregate view of the receipt of any kind of financial subsidy within the first three business 
years of a start-up. I use data from 162 start-ups in innovative industries in the East German 
state of Thuringia.
2 More than 45% of these start-ups make use of financial subsidies which 
are primarily given as soft loans, loan guarantees, or grants. A broad set of ex-ante 
characteristics allows me to analyze the allocation of subsidies. Does the allocation of 
subsidies provide evidence of policy geared toward positive external effects? Or is the policy 
instead focused on remedying capital market imperfections? The answer to both questions 
turns out to be “no”. Logistic regressions reveal that the allocation of subsidies is neither 
based on the rationale of positive external effects nor on subsidies’ potential to cure capital 
market imperfections. Instead, the rather random subsidization reveals likely substitution 
effects. Moreover, I apply propensity score matching to identify the causal effect of 
subsidization and find neither a significant effect of subsidies on business survival nor on 
employment growth. The matching results suggest that subsidized start-ups would have 
survived and thrived in any case and thus indicate deadweight losses. These findings highlight 
the relevance of information and incentive problems when designing and allocating start-up 
subsidies, since policy targeting affects potential market distortions and policy effectiveness. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The next section contains a 
review of the literature that examines the market failure argument to justify start-up subsidies. 
Ex-ante characteristics of start-ups that are most likely to be affected by market failure are 
                                                 
2 This subset of a larger survey does not contain start-ups that engage in R&D within the first three business 
years, since they are eligible for R&D subsidies whose effectiveness has been examined in a previous study 
(Cantner and Kösters, 2009a, b). R&D subsidies have been found to be highly effective, leading to an increase in 
employment growth of about 66% and a rise in patent output of 184%. However, start-ups that do not engage in 
R&D are also widely subsidized and therefore justify a separate analysis. 
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empirical analysis (Section 3), a logistic regression first investigates the characteristics of 
subsidized start-ups. Second, I employ propensity score matching to examine the 




2. Rationale for (no) policy intervention 
Incidences of market failure constitute a necessary but not sufficient condition for policy 
intervention. Market failure arises from a lacking appropriability of returns from 
entrepreneurial activity (Section 2.1) as well as from asymmetric information leading to 
capital market imperfections (Section 2.2). In these two sections, the ex-ante characteristics of 
start-ups that will likely lead to market failure, and that thus should guide subsidy allocation, 
are derived. Section 2.3 then summarizes these conjectures for subsidy allocation and 
discusses the implications of policy targeting for market distortions and policy effectiveness. 
 
2.1 Positive external effects 
Audretsch and Thurik (2004) identify three channels through which entrepreneurial activity 
has an impact on economic growth. First, entrepreneurship spurs knowledge spillovers, since 
it is a mechanism by which knowledge—captured in founders and their business ideas—is 
commercialized. Second, entrepreneurship is accompanied by firm entry, exit, and turnover, 
which implies increased competition. Increased competition will be more conducive to 
knowledge externalities (Jacobs, 1969; Porter, 1990) because it increases the pressure to 
innovate. Third, a start-up contributes to diversity since it is an attempt to commercialize 
knowledge that otherwise would have remained uncommercialized (Audretsch and Keilbach, 
2004). Increased diversity among firms and a higher variety of enterprises are argued to 
enhance regional growth since knowledge spillovers external to an industry are believed to be 
the most valuable kind (Jacobs, 1969; Glaeser et al., 1992). However, industry characteristics 
can create a tradeoff between the benefits of diversity resulting from a high number of small 
firms and large firms’ advantage of appropriating the returns from innovative activity (Cohen 
and Klepper, 1992). For instance, an industry structure dominated by many small firms will 
be socially beneficial if the respective technology is characterized by a number of different 
4 
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other mechanisms. 
The above mechanisms make clear that entrepreneurship does not always contribute to 
economic growth. Santarelli and Vivarelli (2007) point out that new firm formation leads not 
only to Schumpeterian “creative destruction”, but also to “market churning”, which occurs 
when ill-equipped firms continuously enter and exit the market. Market churning is reflected 
in the positive correlation between entry and exit rates that is found in many empirical studies 
(Bartelsman et al., 2005; Geroski, 1995). High-quality start-ups are argued to contribute most 
to economic performance (Fritsch, 2008). The characteristics and impact of these high-quality 
start-ups include the following. First, innovative start-ups commercialize knowledge and thus 
give rise to knowledge spillovers. Their innovations imply greater variety for customers and 
better matching customer preferences and will, ultimately, result in higher utility for 
customers (Fritsch, 2008). Innovative start-ups are additionally characterized by a high 
endowment of human capital because a rich knowledge base enables the recognition and 
exploitation of high-quality entrepreneurial opportunities (Ucbasaran et al., 2009; Baron, 
2006). Entrepreneurs’ human capital positively affects the post-entry performances of their 
start-ups and will thus contribute to static and dynamic efficiency (Colombo and Grilli, 2005; 
Fritsch, 2008). The empirical evidence supports the view that innovative start-ups and/or 
start-ups with a high endowment of human capital make a strong contribution to structural 
change (Acs and Mueller, 2008; Baptista and Preto, 2006). 
Second, start-ups with superior financial resources have higher survival chances and 
better performance (Cooper et al., 1994; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994; Brüderl et al., 1992). 
Cooper et al. (1994) argue that initial capital has both direct and indirect impacts on 
performance. As a direct effect, financial resources allow start-ups to pursue more capital-
intensive strategies (which might be more efficient and better protected from imitation) and to 
realize venture growth. Furthermore, financial resources constitute a buffer against random 
shocks. Indirectly, superior financial resources might reflect higher endowments of human 
capital and more extensive planning that has attracted outside lenders and investors. Start-ups 
with high endowments of financial capital are thus able to mount a greater challenge to 
incumbents and, in this way, will ensure efficiency and stimulate productivity (Fritsch, 2008). 
Third, the rare phenomenon of high-growth entrepreneurship accounts 
disproportionately for innovative change and economic growth (Autio, 2005; Henrekson and 
Johansson, 2008; Wong et al., 2005; Stam et al., 2009). There are various definitions of and 
terms used to describe high-growth entrepreneurship (Buss, 2002), ranging from “gazelles” 
5 
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2009).
3 All these definitions, though, have in common that they combine the above 
characteristics (innovativeness, rich endowment with human capital, and financial capital) 
with an ambition to grow.  
 
To sum up, the impact of heterogeneous start-up activity on economic performance is 
ambiguous. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that innovative, well-equipped (in terms of a 
rich knowledge base and financial strength), and growth-oriented start-ups yield positive 
external effects in the long run.
4 This is especially true if they are started in a supportive 
regional environment (Fritsch, 2008). For instance, Fritsch and Mueller (2004) find that new 
business formation has a particularly strong impact on employment change in agglomerations 
and high-productivity regions, whereas even a negative impact can be observed in regions 
with low productivity. Entrepreneurial activity varies not only within but across countries. 
Cross-country studies find that the impact of entrepreneurial activity on a country’s 
innovative capacity (Wennekers et al., 2005), as well as on its macro-economic performance, 
increases with per capita income (Thurik et al., 2008; van Stel et al., 2005; Stam et al., 2009). 
This work thus suggests that entrepreneurship plays different roles in different countries, 
depending on their stage of economic development. It is important to note, also, that positive 
external effects only become apparent in the long run: the estimated time lag between 
entrepreneurial activity and subsequent economic performance can be as much as 10 years 
(Fritsch and Mueller, 2004; Thurik et al., 2008; van Stel and Suddle, 2007). 
More generally, Auerswald (2007) questions whether potential social returns from 
innovative entrepreneurial activity are a suitable rationale for policy intervention. He argues 
that innovative start-ups can give rise to knowledge spillovers but, at the same time, can reap 
considerable private returns from their innovation due to legal protection in the product 
market or because of high entry costs for potential imitators. Furthermore, the social benefits 
accruing from innovative entrepreneurship are uncertain and will generally lie far in the 
future. They are thus unlikely to much of a motivating factor in the entrepreneur’s decision-
making process. Therefore, Auerswald argues that information asymmetries affect 
                                                 
3  For instance, high-potential innovative start-ups are defined by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor as 
ventures that fulfill the following criteria: (1) start-up aims to employ at least 20 employees in five years; (2) the 
start-up indicates at least some market creation impact; (3) the start-up targets international markets to the extent 
that at least one-fourth of its customer base is abroad; and (4) the applied technologies had not been widely 
available more than a year ago (Wong et al., 2005). 
4 Even failed start-ups may give rise to positive externalities since they may have challenged incumbents and 
given rise to knowledge externalities, e.g., when the ideas and experiences of their former employees become an 
integral part of products made by successful firms (Audretsch et al., 2007; Fritsch, 2008). 
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capital constraints, which result from information asymmetries. 
 
2.2 Capital constraints 
Information imperfections leading to credit market failure are accused of creating a barrier to 
the acquisition of loan capital by nascent and young entrepreneurs. If this is indeed the case, 
such imperfections thus impede the actual start-up of a venture as well as jeopardize both its 
survival and growth. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that credit rationing characterizes the 
equilibrium state if banks cannot observe borrowers’ risks. In the presence of imperfect 
information, the price (i.e., the interest rate) affects the nature of the transaction since 
increasing interest rates or collateral requirements attract riskier entrepreneurs (adverse 
selection) and induce borrowers to invest in riskier projects (moral hazard). Therefore, it may 
not be profitable for a bank to raise interest rates to clear the market, but it will rather limit the 
number of loans. In other words, credit rationing implies that banks grant credit only to a 
fraction of observationally identical projects. A project could still be denied credit even if it 
offered to pay a higher interest rate (Parker, 2002). The likelihood of credit rationing is, 
ceteris paribus, higher for start-ups and small firms because the fixed costs of granting and 
servicing loans lower the profit margin on lending to smaller businesses. Furthermore, 
according to Blumberg and Letterie (2008), the fewer the number of repeat transactions, the 
less the incentive for business analysts to collect information and the fewer the instruments 
with which start-ups can signal their credibility. Asymmetric information can be resolved by 
commitments such as collateral, the investment of own resources, and the provision of costly 
information that increase the credibility of the credit application. Additionally, founders can 
signal good prospects for later business success since banks are interested in long-term 
relationships with successful start-ups (Storey, 1993; Blumberg and Letterie, 2008). However, 
the theoretical case for credit rationing is ambiguous. De Meza and Webb (1987) diagnose the 
problem as overlending rather than credit rationing when just slightly modifying the 
assumptions of the Stiglitz and Weiss model.
5 This theoretical debate has spawned a huge 
body of empirical literature analyzing the impact of capital constraints on the decision to start 
a venture as well as on the performance of newborn firms (Cressy, 2002; van Praag et al., 
2005). 
                                                 
5 De Meza and Webb (1987) allow the expected return to vary across firms, whereas Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
assume that all firms have the same expected return but that the dispersion of returns is different. 
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individual characteristics of the founders and their start-ups (Blumberg and Letterie, 2008). 
First, innovative start-ups are argued to be particularly affected by asymmetric information in 
capital markets (Colombo and Grilli, 2007; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Guiso, 1998) since 
the returns from innovative activity are uncertain, highly skewed, and difficult for outsiders to 
evaluate. Additionally, investment in innovative activity mainly encompasses salaries and the 
acquisition of highly specialized assets, neither of which provide much collateral value in the 
event of failure (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). Parker and van Praag (2006) find that 
entrepreneurs in capital-intensive industries are significantly more likely to be affected by 
credit constraints. Since this effect is in addition to the scale effect from higher capital needs, 
they argue that banks’ screening errors are systematically greater in industries in which 
production techniques are more complicated and involve intangible capital. Still, innovative 
start-ups might self-select into other forms of lending (Åstebro and Bernhardt, 2003; 
Carpenter and Petersen, 2002), therefore easing potential capital constraints. Carpenter and 
Petersen (2002) argue that equity financing has a number of advantages over debt for highly 
innovative firms since equity financing allows unbounded upside returns for investors. 
Furthermore, it neither increases a start-up’s probability of financial distress nor does it 
induce managers to engage in excessively risky projects. However, Lerner (2002) points to 
the limited scope of the venture capital industry, which backs only a tiny fraction of 
technology-oriented start-ups. 
Ventures started by founders with limited financial resources might be a second group 
that suffers from capital constraints. Poor people’s restricted access to credit markets can be 
explained by their inability to commit themselves by investing own resources. The 
commitment of personal wealth is another important mechanism for mitigating asymmetric 
information (Blumberg and Letterie, 2008). This implies that collateral-based lending tends to 
discriminate against the poor, regardless of the quality of the project itself (Cowling and 
Mitchell, 2003). Van Praag et al. (2005) summarize studies that relate personal wealth to 
various performance measures of entrepreneurial ventures, all of which finds either a positive 
or no impact of assets on performance. This literature can be traced back to Evans and 
Jovanovic (1989), who estimate that the capital stock that entrepreneurs can invest is 
restricted to 1.5-fold of their initial assets. In this way, liquidity constraints prevent people 
with few assets from either engaging in entrepreneurship altogether, or force them to start a 
business with less than the optimal amount of capital. On the other hand, however, a lack of 
personal assets may suggest a lack of human capital, implying, in turn, deficient economic 
8 
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when the relationship between windfall gains (e.g., inheritances or lottery prizes) and 
performance is analyzed. Nevertheless, such studies still point to the presence of liquidity 
constraints, since the receipt of windfall gains increases the probability of becoming self-
employed and enhances start-up performance (Lindh and Ohlsson, 1996; Taylor, 2001, Holtz-
Eakin et al., 1994). 
Finally, capital constraints might particularly affect start-ups endowed with low human 
capital, since they are deprived of an important signaling mechanism that helps overcome 
asymmetric information. Low human capital implies both a limited chance of success of the 
start-up and low post-failure earning capacity. However, a positive assessment of the potential 
for success and the consequently increased probability that the founder will be able to repay 
the debt is crucial in overcoming a bank’s reluctance to lend (Blumberg and Letterie, 2008). 
Empirically, Åstebro and Bernhardt (2005), as well as Parker and van Praag (2006), show that 
higher endowments of human capital lower initial capital constraints. Åstebro and Bernhardt 
(2005) find this effect to be nonlinear, that is, a high-school diploma offsets the credit 
constraint, but higher levels of education have only limited impact on reducing capital 
constraints. In contrast to the studies discussed above, Cressy (1996) finds that the positive 
relation between financial capital and survival disappears once human capital is controlled 
for. This finding throws doubt on the case for credit rationing since financing decisions made 
on the basis of observable characteristics such as human capital merely reflect the bank’s 
desire to allocate funds wisely. 
 
In summary, although credit rationing cannot be rejected on theoretical grounds, the empirical 
evidence for it appears to be rather limited at best, no doubt in part due to the difficulty of 
identifying credit rationing. On the one hand, there are at least two reasons why a positive 
effect of financial variables on performance does not necessarily imply credit rationing 
(Parker, 2002; van Praag et al., 2005). First, these studies make the initial assumption that 
there is no direct way of obtaining external finance (van Praag et al., 2005). Second, the 
problem of endogeneity is often neglected. Endogeneity arises because assets could have been 
accumulated by superior entrepreneurial ability (human capital), which is in turn responsible 
for above-average entrepreneurial performance. On the other hand, survey studies measure the 
extent of credit constraints more directly. Levenson and Willard (2002) analyze survey data 
from the United States in the late 1980s and find that 6.36% firms are credit-rationed, which 
is stated to be an outside estimate because this figure includes discouraged borrowers and 
9 
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mid-1990s, Parker and Van Praag (2006) find that 19% of new founders obtained less finance 
than they required. However, self-reports of credit constraints bear the risk of bias, since 
entrepreneurs might see the lack of external finance as the main cause of their problems, 
whereas it might be just a symptom of other deficiencies of the start-up (Santarelli and 
Vivarelli, 2007; Parker, 2002). Additionally, empirical studies differ in their definitions of 
credit rationing.
6 Parker (2002) thus questions whether credit rationing is a suitable rationale 
for policy intervention and points to positive external effects of entrepreneurship, thereby 
contradicting Auerswald (2007). Having in mind data and measurement limitations, the 
literature summarized above nevertheless suggests that innovative start-ups as well as start-
ups with few financial resources and low endowments of human capital are more likely to be 
affected by capital constraints. 
 
2.3 Targeting of policy intervention 
The previous subsections have shown that the extent of positive external effects and capital 
market imperfections is disputed (Auerswald, 2007; Parker, 2002). Nevertheless, regardless of 
the degree to which they exist, they may still hamper start-up and growth of efficient ventures 
and thus constitute a necessary condition for policy intervention. However, the information 
requirements for identifying incidences of market failure are extremely demanding. Not only 
do policymakers and funding agencies need to know social and private returns ex-ante in 
order to discern external effects, they also have to identify the information asymmetries that 
lead to capital market imperfections. Incidences of market failure have to be identified ex-ante 
for every single project that applies for subsidization. If exact policy targeting of the 
individual marginal entrepreneur is not possible, it is questionable whether policy intervention 
will do any good at all. Subsidies give their recipients an artificial competitive edge and might 
thus lower the intrinsic difference between ex-ante less efficient and more efficient start-ups. 
In this way, subsidization distorts market selection as well as the learning processes inherent 
in a new business. Market selection remains the crucial mechanism for singling out innovative 
entrepreneurship from less viable start-ups and ridding the market of less efficient incumbent 
firms (Fritsch, 2008; Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). Moreover, actual subsidy allocation has 
                                                 
6 For instance, Parker (2002) defines credit rationing as a situation where some entrepreneurs are denied credit 
although they are willing to pay a higher interest rate and even though they are observationally identical to 
entrepreneurs who receive credit. In contrast, Evans and Jovanovich (1989) estimate the multiple of the 
founder’s assets that can be devoted to the business. This multiple is then used as a measure of the degree of 
liquidity constraints. For an overview of definitions of credit rationing, see Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990). 
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entrepreneur, subsidies will be granted where most needed and thus will produce the best 
results, leading to high effectiveness. Additionally, a specific policy focus will increase 
efficiency because it allows realizing the most economic impact with the least amount of 
funds (Stam et al., 2009; Bridge et al., 2003). 
Given the implications of policy targeting, the actual allocation of start-up subsidies is 
of crucial importance in assessing likely market distortions and evaluating policy 
effectiveness and efficiency. Assuming that the primary policy aim is addressing positive 
external effects (cf. Section 2.1), policy should primarily support innovative founders and 
founders with high endowments of human and financial capital. Potential high-growth 
entrepreneurship should be especially targeted. If, on the other hand, the primary policy aim is 
addressing capital market imperfections (cf. Section 2.2), policy should be designed chiefly to 
support, again, innovative founders, but this time also those founders with low human capital 
and a lack of financial resources. Table 1 summarizes the expected patterns of correlation 
between start-up characteristics and the receipt of subsidies depending on whether the policy 
goal is creation of positive external effects or, alternatively, addressing capital market 
imperfections. It is unclear whether high-growth entrepreneurship is affected by capital 
market imperfections, since relationship banking and private venture capital firms can be 
expected to circumvent this problem (Binks and Ennew, 1996; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). 
Therefore, this relation is denoted with a question mark. Apart from innovative 
entrepreneurship, potential sources of market failure thus point to diverging target groups of 
policy initiatives. 
Policy targeting: Expected signs 






Innovativeness  + + 
High-growth entrepreneurship  + ? 
Human capital  + - 
Financial resources  + - 
Table 1: Start-up characteristics and expected policy support according to policy goal 
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effect of minimizing the risk of substitution effects because it implies a policy focus on the 
ex-ante most promising start-ups—in terms of both social and private returns (Santarelli and 
Vivarelli, 2007; Shane, 2009). If policy intervention is successful in “picking winners”, 
subsidies will not protect inefficient start-ups from market competition. Therefore, this policy 
strategy is least likely to interfere with market selection, which forces inefficient start-ups out 
of business. However, if policymakers cannot sufficiently distinguish between social returns 
and private returns ex-ante, a policy focus on innovative high-growth start-ups that are 
endowed with superior human and financial capital runs the risk of enormous deadweight 
losses because these firms might survive and thrive regardless of whether they receive a 
subsidy (Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). 
In the next section, I investigate empirically whether policy allocation follows the 
rationale of positive external effects or is based on addressing capital market imperfections. 
Alternatively, the difficulties in quantifying social and private returns and identifying 
information imperfections ex-ante might blur the actual targeting of policies (Stiglitz and 
Wallsten, 2000). Therefore, it could turn out that the diverse subsidy environment, with its 
myriad programs, engages in no coherent targeting strategy whatsoever. However, if overall 
policy allocation is not targeted towards alleged market failure, the rationale for policy 
intervention disappears. Furthermore, seemingly random subsidization of start-ups distorts 
market selection and is likely to be ineffective and inefficient. 
 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
In the empirical analysis, I first examine the allocation of subsidies to start-ups within their 
first three business years. The logistic regressions will determine whether policy targeting 
either addresses positive external effects potentially accruing from entrepreneurship or 
focuses on alleged capital market imperfections resulting from asymmetric information. 
Additionally, insights about actual policy targeting shed light on the likelihood of market 
distortions arising from substitution effects. In a second step, I analyze the effectiveness of 
subsidization with respect to employment growth and survival. To detect potential deadweight 
losses, I employ propensity score matching. 
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Data for this study were collected by the Thuringian Founder Study (Thüringer Gründer 
Studie), an interdisciplinary project on the success and failure of innovative start-ups in the 
East German state of Thuringia. The survey population consists of 4,215 founders (first-
registered owner-managers) who registered 2,971 start-ups in innovative industries in the 
Thuringian Handelsregister between 1994 and 2006. Innovative industries, according to ZEW 
classification (Grupp and Legler, 2000), encompass “advanced technology” and “technology-
oriented services”. This design made it possible to interview not only founders of active 
companies but also founders of ventures that had failed. From the survey population, we 
selected a random sample of 3,671 start-up founders. Due to team start-ups, this corresponds 
to 2,604 start-ups in innovative industries. Between January and October 2008, we conducted 
639 face-to-face interviews with solo entrepreneurs or with one member of a start-up team (a 
response rate of about 25%). 
The structured interviews were conducted by the members of the research project. We 
were supported by student research assistants who were trained in various sessions in 
December 2007. On average, an interview took one and a half hours. The interviews covered 
a broad set of questions regarding sociodemographic and psychological data of the founder. 
Moreover, we inquired into the founder’s activities along the founding process. Economic 
data focused on the time before the first business year and the first three business years. 
Retrospective data relating to events in the founder’s life and to the business history were 
collected using a modified version of the Life-History Calendar (Belli et al., 2004), which 
increases the validity of retrospective data.
7
I analyze 162 genuinely new start-ups that were all founded later than 1993
8 and that 
did not engage in R&D within their first three business years. Financial subsidies were given 
to 73 of these firms (45.1% ) at sometime during the first three business years. The mere 
receipt of any subsidy within the first three business years is denoted with the dummy variable 
Subsidy. Since start-ups can make use of several policy instruments simultaneously, policy 
take-up is further specified by five policy instruments: soft loans, loan guarantees, grants, 
public equity financing, and other support. Soft loans and grants are the most widespread 
instruments (see Fig. 1). Loan guarantees are only used in combination with soft loans. 
                                                 
7 This method is based on the principles of autobiographic memory. In a first step, we asked interviewees about 
the timing of well-known events (e.g., marriage). In a second step, these events served as anchors for less well 
represented events (e.g., first interest in entrepreneurship). 
8 This is done to exclude any effects of German Reunification in 1990. Additionally, 88 start-ups were removed 
because they were not genuinely new (e.g., they were a new branch or new business area of an existing 
company) or because they suffered from poor interview quality. 
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analysis. 
Three observations are dropped from further analysis: the only observation that 
received public equity funding and two observations that received “other” policy support. All 
remaining subsidized start-ups receive either soft loans (possibly combined with loan 
guarantees) and/or grants. Founders were asked which instrument was the most important. 
These answers are captured by the variable Subsidy_type, which distinguishes between “no 
subsidies”, “soft loan/loan guarantee”, and “grant”: 17.0% of founders received soft loans 
(potentially combined with loan guarantees) and consider these as the most important policy 








































Overall take-up of 
101 policy instruments
 
Note: N = 162; start-ups can make use of more than one policy instrument 
Fig. 1: Take-up of policy instruments within the first three business years 
 
 
3.2 Targeting of policy support 
Does actual policy allocation follow the rationale of positive external effects or do 
policymakers focus on remedying capital market imperfections? In the following, the 
targeting of policy support is analyzed with a logistic regression. 
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The variables below specify ex-ante characteristics that describe whether policy targeting is 
oriented toward innovativeness, high-growth entrepreneurship and endowments of human 
capital, and/or financial resources. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics are given in 
Table 2; Table 3 sets out the intercorrelations. 
  Variables Variable  description  Mean  Sd 
Innovativeness  Novelty 
The novelty of the business idea refers to the degree of its 
newness. Five categories were given: novelty (0), regional or 
local (1), supra-regional but national (2), European (3), and 






Interviewees had to classify their goals at the beginning of 
the first business year given the following contradictory pair 
with a 5-level scale in-between: to generate constant 
revenues vs. to generate constantly rising revenues. If 
founder’s growth goals are above the mean, the dummy 




The dummy variable indicates if the interviewed founder had 





The dummy variable indicates if the interviewed founder was 
self-employed at any time before the first steps in the 
founding process. 
0.39 0.49 Human 
capital 
Team start-up 
Team start-ups are defined as venture set-ups where more 
than one person was actively involved in the founding 
process and was intended to become an owner of the 
company. This dummy variable is coded 0 in the case of a 
single founder, and 1 in the case of a team start-up. 
0.65 0.48
Financial 
resources  Initial capital 
The amount of starting capital at the beginning of the first 
business year was asked for with the help of the following 
categories: 1,000 EUR or less (1), more than 1,000 to 10,000 
EUR (2), more than 10,000 to 50,000 EUR (3), more than 
50,000 to 100,000 EUR (4), more than 100,000 to 250,000 
EUR (5), more than 250,000 to 500,000 EUR (6), more than 




1997  0.44 0.50
Year 1998–
2001  0.36 0.48 Year dummies 
Year 2002–
2006 
Dummy variables that capture the time of business start, i.e., 
the first business year of the company when accounting 
started either because of obligations from the commercial 
register or because of first revenues. 
0.19 0.40
Nace 2  Chemical industry, metalworking industry, engineering 0.16  0.37
Nace 3  Electrical engineering, fine mechanics, and optics  0.19  0.40




digit)  Nace x  Miscellaneous industries 0.31  0.47
N = 159 
Table 2: Variable definition and descriptive statistics 
 
Founders’ ambitions have been found to be positively related to subsequent firm growth 
(Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003), thus justifying Growth goals as an ex-ante characteristic of 
high-growth entrepreneurship. Three variables describe the start-up’s endowment with human 
capital. The variable University degree captures general human capital, whereas Previous self-
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1992). For instance, experienced entrepreneurs have been found to identify more 
opportunities and exploit more innovative opportunities with greater wealth creation potential 
(Ucbasaran et al., 2009). A team start-up accumulates the human capital of its members; 
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  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) Employment  growth  -          
(2) Credit  rating  -0.15 *  -        
(3) Subsidies  0.19 **  0.04   -      
(4) Novelty  -0.14 *  -0.03   -0.04   -        
(5) Growth  goals  0.07   0.10   -0.05   -0.08   -     
(6) University  degree  -0.13 *  -0.11   0.06   0.04   -0.09   -      
(7) Previous  self-employment -0.18 **  0.18 **  -0.14 *  0.35 ***  -0.03   -0.04   -      
(8) Team  start-up  -0.09   0.12   0.06   -0.06   -0.08   0.01   0.04   -    
(9) Initial  capital  -0.04   -0.07   0.23 *** -0.07   0.14 *  -0.02   -0.12   0.10   -    
(10) Year  1994–1997  0.04   -0.02   -0.12   -0.10   -0.10   -0.02   -0.14 *  0.01   0.12   -    
(11) Year  1998–2001  0.01   -0.00   0.04   0.08   0.20 **  0.10   0.20 **  -0.03   -0.11   -0.67 ***  -    
(12) Year  2002–2006  -0.06    0.03    0.11   0.03  -0.11  -0.09  -0.07   0.02   -0.03  -0.44 ***  -0.37 ***  -    
(13) Nace  2  0.24 ***  -0.11   0.26 *** 0.21 **  0.05   -0.12   -0.04   -0.11   0.15 *  -0.05   0.05   -0.00   -    
(14) Nace  3  -0.04   -0.02   -0.02  -0.01   0.08  -0.13  -0.07   0.09    0.19 **  0.08  -0.08  -0.00  -0.22 ***  -    
(15) Nace  7  -0.07    0.02    0.06   0.01  -0.06   0.20 **  0.02   0.03   -0.13  -0.05   0.03   0.03  -0.31 ***  -0.34 ***  -  
(16) Nace  x  -0.09   0.09   -0.25 *** -0.17 **  -0.05   0.00   0.07   -0.02   -0.15 *  0.03   -0.01   -0.03   -0.30 ***  -0.33 ***  -0.47 ***  - 
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
N = 159; however, due to missing values for the credit rating, the intercorrelations with the survival indicator comprise only 125 observations. 
Table 3: Correlation matrix 
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The following regressions reveal the determinants of subsidization. In a first step, the logistic 
regression analyzes whether innovativeness, high-growth entrepreneurship, human capital, 
and/or financial resources determine subsidization. Therefore, the variables described in Table 
2 are employed as independent variables. The estimates of the logistic regression are given in 
the first column of Table 4. The novelty of the business idea (Novelty), founder’s Growth 
goals as well as the human capital variables have no impact on the probability of receiving 
subsidies. The amount of Initial capital exerts a positive and highly significant impact on the 
probability of receiving subsidies. Having been founded more recently increases the 
probability of subsidization (significant at the 10% level). Subsidies are more likely to be 
given to start-ups operating in the chemical industry, metalworking industry, and engineering 
(Nace 2) (r: 1.912; p = 0.002). Furthermore, the coefficient of Nace 7 (information and 
communication technology, R&D, services) indicates a positive relationship to subsidization 
at the 5% significance level. 
   Logistic regression   Multinomial logistic regression 
(base outcome: no subsidization) 





  Soft loans (and loan 
guarantees)  Grants 
Novelty   -0.067   -0.084  -0.098  
Growth goals    -0.553   -0.455  -0.650  
University degree    0.348   -0.168  0.684  
Previous self-
employment    -0.557   -1.285**  -0.187  
Team start-up    0.370    0.626  0.234  
Initial capital    0.569 ***   0.586**  0.553 ** 
Year 1998–2001    0.757 *   0.156  1.160 ** 
Year 2002–2006    0.923 *   -0.115  1.507 *** 
Nace 2    1.912 ***   2.204***  1.714 ** 
Nace 3    0.529    0.435  0.563  
Nace 7    0.922 **   1.138  0.824  
Constant   -3.130 ***   -3.582***  -4.039 *** 
27  43  Number of observations    159 
159 
Log likelihood    -91.888  -131.934 
Pseudo-R
2   0.1575  0.1529 
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
89 non-subsidized start-ups form the base outcome in the multinomial logistic regression. 
Table 4: Logistic regressions 
 
In a second step, a multinomial analysis is conducted to distinguish between the two major 
policy instruments—soft loans (combined with loan guarantees) and grants. The results of the 
multinomial logistic regression are shown in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4. A history of 
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1.285; p=0.035), but has no effect of the receipt of a grant. Grants are given significantly 
more often to start-ups founded more recently (time dummies significant at 1% and 5% 
levels). Otherwise, the separate analysis of grants and soft loans/loan guarantees in the 
multinomial logit regression does not reveal different determinants of subsidization compared 




The logistic regressions fail to reveal that subsidy allocation is based on start-ups’ ex-ante 
characteristics as hypothesized in Table 1. Hence, the analysis sheds no light on whether 
policy is focused on remedying capital market imperfections or on the creation of positive 
external effects. Apart from a positive impact of the amount of financial resources (Initial 
capital) on subsidization, which indicates policy targeting of start-ups likely to yield positive 
external effects, all other indicators of the rationale for policy targeting are insignificant 
(Novelty, Growth goals, University degree, Team start-up). Hence, the allocation achieved by 
policy schemes does not suggest that the schemes are working to address market failure. 
Furthermore, the multinomial logistic regression reveals no distinct differences between 
subsidies in the form of soft loans/loan guarantees and grants, thus raising doubts as to the 
necessity of different instruments. 
However, it is not only policymakers and program officials that play a role in the 
selection of subsidy beneficiaries; founders and their start-ups might self-select into the 
programs (Storey, 2000). Figure 2 shows the self-reported reasons for nonsubsidization. The 
first two categories, which represent 74.2% of nonsubsidized founders, can be viewed as 
founder self-selection. Self-selection is thus the primary driver of selective policy support. 
The other categories can be more or less regarded as committee selection. The founders of 
7.9% of nonsubsidized ventures reported that is was the too-complicated application 
procedures that prevented them from applying. This category probably blurs with the fourth 
category (“not eligible, therefore not applied”), as both are simply different forms of dropping 
out of the information and application process. The applications of 5.6% of nonsubsidized 
founders were rejected, indicating clear-cut committee selection. 
                                                 
9 Given the relatively low number of observations in each category of the variable Subsidy_type  and the 
descriptive character of the logistic regressions, the multinomial logistic regression was run with a reduced set of 
independent variables, resulting in only minor changes of the coefficients. 
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N = 89 (i.e., all nonsubsidized observations) 
Fig. 2: Reasons for nonsubsidization 
Hence, the allocation of start-up subsidies could be driven by both demand and supply and 
might thus reflect changes in the availability and the design of policy schemes, as well as 
changing policy take-up over time. For instance, the increased subsidization via grants over 
time matches the introduction and the increased popularity of start-up subsidies for the 
unemployed starting in 2002, all of which are grant-based (Caliendo et al., 2008). 
 
 
3.3 Effectiveness of policy support 
The previous section demonstrates that subsidies are given neither based on the rationale of 
positive external effects nor on the rationale of capital market imperfections. Therefore, the 
necessary condition for policy intervention does not appear to be met. Furthermore, random 
subsidization is argued to be ineffective. Hence, I additionally assess the effectiveness of 
subsidization with respect to employment growth and survival. First, employment growth is a 
prominent indicator of firm growth and prosperity; moreover, employment growth is an 
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A start-up’s employment growth and survival probability are captured by the following 
variables: 
Employment growth within the first three business years is defined as 
year st year st year rd Employment Employment Employment growth Employment 1 1 3 ) ( − = . 
Here Employment includes work by founders, active partners, conventional employees, hired 
labor, and trainees. The measure is normalized on full-time positions, thereby considering 
part-time jobs. 
Long-term survival is proxied by the start-up’s credit rating five years after founding, 
which we obtained for each start-up from Creditreform, the leading rating agency in 
Germany. The variable Credit rating thus contains Creditreform’s rating index, which ranges 
from 100 (best) to 600 (worst). Creditreform uses several sources of information in making its 
ratings, for example, financial and structural risks such as industry, firm size, and 
productivity, as well as payment history, quantity of orders, firm development, and 
management quality.
10 The credit rating aims to proxy the start-up’s default risk and, indeed, 
credit rating and survival are highly correlated in the present sample (r: -0.462, p = 0.000). 





To identify the causal effect of subsidization, the performance of subsidized and 
nonsubsidized start-ups cannot be compared directly. Although the findings set out in Section 
3.2 did not reveal distinct policy targeting, the first two columns of Table C1 (see the 
Appendix) show differences in previous self-employment, initial capital, and industry 
between subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups. These differences, i.e., the selection bias, 
might lead to different outcomes even in absence of subsidies. Therefore, the counterfactual 
outcome must be discovered, that is, the outcome of a nonsubsidized start-up if it were 
subsidized. 
Matching procedures based on the potential outcome approach of Roy (1951) and 
Rubin (1974) have been developed to address the selection bias in observational data. To 
                                                 
10 For more information on the Creditreform’s credit rating system, see Czarnitzki and Kraft (2007). 
11 Creditreform does not routinely generate credit ratings for each new start-up, but only if there is an external 
request from other firms. Because of missing credit ratings, I exclude 34 observations when analyzing the 
outcome variable Credit rating. These nonrated start-ups turn out to have significantly less initial capital than 
rated start-ups. Hence, it should be borne in mind that the credit rating might imply a systematic bias in favor of 
the larger start-ups. 
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subsidization is completely based on observable characteristics. The conditional independence 
assumption (CIA) states that, given a set of observable exogenous (not affected by the 
treatment) characteristics, potential outcomes are independent of the treatment assignment 
(Smith and Todd, 2005). In other words, if one wants to attribute the differential performance 
to the receipt of subsidies, subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups should not differ in any 
other characteristics that impact on the outcome variable. Implicit in this matching approach 
is the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), which states that subsidization does 
not impact on any start-ups other than those that are explicitly treated (Rubin, 1991). In the 
present context, this implies that subsidies do not impact on nonsubsidized start-ups via 
market effects or knowledge spillovers. Thus, SUTVA rules out general equilibrium effects of 
subsidies. 
It can be difficult, however, to find a nonsubsidized control unit if there is a great 
number of characteristics on which matching takes place. To solve this “curse of 
dimensionality”, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propose the use of propensity score matching. 
The basic idea is not to match on covariates directly, but to match on a function of the 
covariates that describes the propensity to receive subsidies. This predicted probability of 
group membership is usually obtained from logistic regression. There are various matching 
algorithms, all of which contrast the outcome of a subsidized start-up with a weighted average 
of the outcome of (some) nonsubsidized observations. Asymptotically, all matching 
algorithms should yield the same results (Smith, 2000). 
I apply kernel matching, which uses all nonsubsidized start-ups to construct a match 
for each subsidized start-up. This method is the best choice for my data, since the sample is 
small and there are almost as many subsidized as nonsubsidized start-ups. Basically, kernel 
matching juxtaposes the outcome of each subsidized start-up to the weighted sum of all 
nonsubsidized start-ups. The weights assigned by the weighting function to the nonsubsidized 
start-ups are higher the closer the nonsubsidized start-ups match the subsidized start-up with 
respect to the observed characteristics that are captured by the propensity score. The total 
weight of all controls adds up to 1 for each subsidized start-up. The implementation of kernel 
matching involves two choices: the choice of a kernel function and the choice of the 
bandwidth parameter. DiNardo and Tobias (2001) note that the kernel employed is relatively 
unimportant in practice, but that choice of the bandwidth parameter matters. The bandwidth 
parameter determines a tradeoff between “few but good matches” (yielding higher variance) 
and “many but potentially bad matches” (leading to biased estimates). Here, Silverman’s 
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and variance. The exact matching protocol is set out in Table 5. Estimations are made with the 
psmatch2 Stata ado package by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). 
Step 1. A logit model for both outcome variables (employment growth and credit rating) is specified and 
estimated. In this way, the propensity scores for each observation are obtained. The choice of variables and the 
estimation of the propensity score are explained in Appendix A. 
Step 2. The sample is restricted to the region of common support. The common support condition ensures that 
any set of characteristics of subsidized start-ups (as captured by the propensity score) can also be observed for 
nonsubsidized ones. The region of common support is determined by a minimum-maximum comparison of the 
distribution of the propensity score. The imposition of the common support requires dropping 9 (4) observations 
from the analysis of employment growth (credit rating). The distributions of the propensity score that determine 
the region of common support can be found in Appendix B. 
Step 3. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) (Table 5) is the difference between the mean outcome 
of subsidized start-ups and matched nonsubsidized start-ups. Following the notation of Caliendo (2006), the 




0 ] ) , ( [
1 0 1
1 I iI j
j N i Y j i W Y
N
ATT  with   
denoting the outcome of the subsidized start-up i and   the outcome of nonsubsidized start-ups j. N1 (N0) is the 
number of observations in the subsidized group I1 (control group I0). The outcome of i is thus contrasted with the 













j i W . Thereby, 
 denotes a Gaussian kernel   with Pi (Pk) standing for the propensity score of subsidized 
(nonsubsidized) start-ups. The bandwidth parameter   is determined with the following formula, 
 (Silverman, 1986), in which n denotes the number of observations and the term 
ik G ] / ) [( h P P G k i −
h
2 . 0 9 . 0





deviation standard A =  accounts for the distribution of the propensity score.
12
Step 4. The standard error of the matching estimators is calculated using bootstrapping (200 replications).
13 The 
estimates for the average treatment effect (ATT) as well as their bootstrapped standard errors and p-values are set 
out in Table 6. 
Step 5. The matching quality is assessed by analyzing the mean differences between nonsubsidized and 
subsidized matched start-ups. After matching, there should be no significant differences regarding any 
characteristics that are assumed to have an impact on both the receipt of subsidies and the respective outcome 
variable. A comparison of mean differences between subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups is given in Appendix 
C. 
Step 6. To check the robustness of the results, Steps 3, 4, and 5 are repeated for different bandwidth parameters 
, which are employed in the kernel matching algorithm in Step 3.  h
Table 5: Matching protocol 
 
                                                 
12 The calculation is as follows. For the analysis of employment growth,  2037 . 0 )
34 . 1
0.2937
, .2037 0 min( = = A  is inserted in 
5
1
148 9 . 0
−
⋅ ⋅ = A h . Hence, the optimal bandwidth is  0675 . 0 = h . Analogous to the previous calculation, the optimal 
bandwidth for the analysis of our survival indicator is derived by estimating  1657 . 0 )
34 . 1
0.2220
, .1752 0 min( = = A  and 
0571 . 0 121 9 . 0 5
1
= ⋅ ⋅ =
−
A h . 
13 Although a distribution theory for the cross-sectional and difference-in-difference kernel and local linear 
matching is derived in Heckman et al. (1998), standard errors for matching estimators are in practice generated 
using bootstrap resampling methods. The use of bootstrapping is backed by Abadie and Imbens (2008), who 
suggest that the standard bootstrap can be applied to assess the variability of kernel matching estimators. 
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The employment growth of subsidized start-ups exhibits an ATT of 0.3650, i.e., the difference 
between the mean employment growth of subsidized start-ups (0.9831) and matched 
nonsubsidized start-ups (0.6180). However, the higher employment growth of subsidized 
start-ups is not significant. Looking at the indicator for survival, subsidized start-ups have a 
mean credit rating of 302.63 compared to the mean rating of 291.45 of their nonsubsidized 
matched counterparts. Again, the worse credit rating of subsidized start-ups fails to reach 
significance. Table 6 shows that other bandwidth parameters also result in insignificant 
estimates.
14
The matching procedure thus does not reveal any impact of subsidies on employment 
growth or credit rating and thus indicates deadweight losses. Interviewees’ self-report of 
windfall gains is in line with these mixed results. Each founder of a subsidized start-up was 
asked: “Would you have continued your start-up [or, alternatively, important business 
projects] without the subsidies?” About one-third (32.9%) answered “yes, readily”; 37.0% 
said “yes, perhaps or on a reduced scale”; only 26.0% said “no”.
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Mean outcome of # Observations  











Optimal bandwidth (0.0675)  0.9544  0.6087   0.3456   0.2809 0.218   64  84 
Bandwidth 0.02  0.9544  0.5751   0.3793   0.2806 0.177   64  84 
Bandwidth 0.04  0.9544  0.6075   0.3469   0.2714 0.201   64  84 
Bandwidth 0.06  0.9544  0.6130   0.3414   0.2686 0.204   64  84 


















   
Bandwidth 0.10  0.9544  0.5838   0.3706   0.2780 0.183   64  84 
Kernel 
Optimal bandwidth (0.0571)  302.63  291.45  11.18   19.12 0.559    67  54 
Bandwidth 0.02  302.63   306.23   -3.60   29.23 0.902    67  54 
Bandwidth 0.04  302.63   296.55   6.08   21.74 0.780    67  54 
Bandwidth 0.06  302.63   290.86   11.77   19.28 0.542    67  54 

























   
Bandwidth 0.10  302.63   287.23   15.40   20.21 0.446    67  54 
Note: No estimate reaches the 0.1 significance level. 
Table 6: Overview of results obtained from kernel matching employing various bandwidth parameters  
 
Matching relies on strong untestable assumptions, particularly the conditional 
independence assumption. The validity of the conditional independence assumption relies 
crucially on the possibility of comparing subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups on the basis 
                                                 
14 The use of other matching algorithms, such as radius matching, does not yield significant results either. These 
results are not shown here, but can be obtained from the author. 
15 Due to three refusals, the percentages do not add up to 100. 
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founder and the founding team as well as characteristics of the start-up and the business idea, 
it is plausible to assume that the outcomes and the allocation of subsidies are independent, 
conditional on observed attributes. Heckman et al. (1997) point out that matching methods 
substantially reduce biases when, first, all information is collected with the same 
questionnaire for both the subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups and, second, these are 
drawn from the same random sample (which is supported by the experimental evidence of 
Michalopoulos et al. (2004)). Both requisites are met by my dataset. Moreover, the sample is 
considerably homogenous, since I only consider genuinely new start-ups in innovative 
industries in the East German state of Thuringia that were not engaged in R&D. 
 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
In general the results of this paper indicate policy failure. The logistic regressions suggest that 
alleged market failure is not targeted and, furthermore, the matching analysis shows no impact 
of subsidization in terms of higher employment growth or higher chances of firm survival. 
Ineffective subsidies do not imply that subsidies have no effects at all, however, since 
subsidies might provide inefficient start-ups with an artificial competitive edge and thus 
distort market selection. However, I can only speculate about substitution effects because the 
matching approach explicitly ignores the market effects of subsidies.
16 The present study has 
several limitations. To begin with, the likelihood and the extent of substitution effects depend 
on the amount of subsidies, information I do not have. This also implies that I cannot analyze 
a potential targeting that bases the amount of subsidy on start-up characteristics. Furthermore, 
small sample sizes and high standard deviations provide good reasons to interpret the present 
results with some caution. 
Still, the analysis has significant implications for future evaluations. Although I cannot 
distinguish between individual programs and funding agencies, my study does point out the 
limited potential of policy targeting. Since no distinct differences between grant-based 
intervention and loan-based intervention are found, it is worth asking whether the myriad 
programs and the diverse structure of funding agencies mitigate intricate information 
problems in allocating subsidies. If the wide range of different schemes and funding agencies 
do not, in practice, improve policy targeting, they very well may be quite successful at 
increasing administrative costs and enhancing the difficulty of policy evaluation, the latter 
                                                 
16 This is due to the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA). 
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effectiveness is hampered by low sample sizes (a problem this study ran up against itself). 
Moreover, the present findings question fundamentally the general subsidization of 
start-ups as an instrument to tackle market failure. First, the existence of market failure is far 
from clear and cannot be claimed to universally hamper entrepreneurship. This is true both for 
positive external effects (Auerswald, 2007) and capital market imperfections (Parker, 2002). 
Moreover, some authors state excessive participation in entrepreneurship resulting from 
overlending and overoptimism and thus argue for discouraging entrepreneurship (de Meza, 
2002; Parker, 2007; Shane, 2009). 
Second, if policy intervention is agreed upon, incidences of market failure have to be 
identified individually ex-ante to guide subsidy allocation. Precise policy targeting, however, 
is unlikely due to fundamental information problems (Holtz-Eakin, 2000). Presumably, banks 
use the best screening technology available to minimize information asymmetries that cause 
capital market imperfections, and Parker and van Praag (2006) doubt that government can do 
a better or even equal job at this, an ability that would be necessary for successful policy 
intervention. Similarly, Stiglitz and Wallsten (2000, p. 47) describe the “monumental task” of 
identifying marginal projects that have the potential to yield social returns but that will not be 
realized in the absence of subsidies because the private returns are too low. Moreover, the 
extent of self-selection into subsidization (remember that 58.4% of founders indicated no 
interest and/or need for policy support) limits policymakers’ potential of selective policy 
targeting. 
Third, public-choice considerations suggest that policymakers and funding authorities 
may have incentives that actually conflict with a policy targeting market failure. On the one 
hand, policymakers and funding authorities are keen on portraying themselves as the 
engineers of success and are thus motivated to fund projects that would have succeeded even 
without their help (Lerner, 1999). This situation is further aggravated by a different culture of 
risk-taking in the public sector. Stiglitz and Wallsten (2000) point out that program officials 
may have a tendency to focus on choosing projects that have a high probability of success 
instead of funding projects for which even higher returns can be expected but that are riskier. 
On the other hand, start-up subsidies also serve as a labor market instrument and thus are 
given to the potentially less promising ventures (Caliendo et al., 2008; Santarelli and 
Vivarelli, 2007). Additionally, applicants can apply for subsidies using language and 
descriptions that enhance the probability of receiving the subsidy—a kind of “playing the 
system”.  
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policymakers, program officials, and potential awardees blur the actual targeting of policies. 
However, arbitrary policy allocation has severe implications for policy effectiveness and 
market distortions. On the one hand, if market failure does not exist, recipients probably do 
not need subsidization and taxpayers’ money spent on such is wasted (Stam et al., 2009). 
Conversely, a previous evaluation of R&D subsidies finds a distinct policy focus on 
innovative start-ups and academic spin-offs as well as a high effectiveness of R&D subsidies 
regarding patent output and employment growth (Cantner and Kösters, 2009a, b). The 
findings for the present subset of non-R&D start-ups put the highly positive effects of 
subsidies earmarked for R&D into perspective and show how important the analysis of 
subsets of heterogeneous start-ups is. On the other hand, market distortions arise if subsidies 
cannot be limited to selectively remedy market failure. Therefore, some authors suggest a 
policy strategy of “picking the winner” because then subsidies are least likely to interfere with 
market selection (Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007; Shane, 2009). Yet, those start-ups that 
exhibit the most promising characteristics are probably the ones that need government support 
the least. 
The information needs for policymaking can be alleviated by choice of policy 
instrument. Human-capital-based policy instruments are favored by most economists (e.g., 
Fritsch, 2008; Audretsch and Thurik, 2001), since start-ups with high endowments of human 
capital are less likely to face capital constraints and, at the same time, are more likely to yield 
social returns. Moreover, Schmitt-Rodermund and Vondracek (2002) emphasize that career 
interests are formed early in adolescence. They thus suggest policy action that helps 
adolescents discover their interests and abilities and makes them aware of entrepreneurship as 
a career option. This kind of entrepreneurship education should be offered to all adolescents, 
i.e., all potential future entrepreneurs. Thereafter, special training should be provided for those 
who have the right combination of personality and entrepreneurial orientation. In this way, the 
targeting problem is more clear-cut and, additionally, such a policy initiative will not distort 
market selection, since it targets the individual before the actual start-up of the venture. 
However, such a policy focus would require a major shift in actual policymaking—away from 
targeting start-ups and established firms and toward empowering the individual (potential) 
entrepreneur. 
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A—Variable choice and estimation of the propensity score 
A propensity score model must be estimated for each outcome variable, including those 
variables that influence both the receipt of subsidies as well as the respective outcome 
variable. To identify these variables, I look for variables that correlate with the receipt of 
subsidies and simultaneously with the respective success measure (employment growth and 
survival) (Table 3). Moreover, I conduct multivariate analyses to identify other distinguishing 
characteristics between subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups that have an impact at the 
same time on employment growth and survival, respectively. In the following, the variable 
choice for each propensity score model is explained. 
Employment growth. Table 3 shows that the variables Previous self-employment and 
Nace 2 are correlated with both the take-up of subsidies as well as employment growth. Initial 
capital varies greatly between subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups. Although not in line 
with the present data, previous studies suggest that initial capital impacts on employment 
growth (e.g., Cooper et al., 1994). I thus include Initial capital as a balancing variable. Initial 
matching procedures show that the matched samples differed in founders’ Growth goals. 
Since ambitions have also been found to impact on realized employment growth (Wiklund 
and Shepherd, 2003), this variable is also included.
17 Ordinary least squares regressions 
cannot identify other joint determinants of subsidization and employment growth, so that the 
propensity score is finally estimated with the variables Initial capital,  Previous self-
employment, Growth goals, and the industry dummies. 
Credit rating. Only the variable Previous self-employment is correlated with both the 
receipt of subsidies as well as with survival as proxied by the credit rating (Table 3). 
Additionally, I balance subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups on the basis of Initial capital 
and industry because financial endowment and industry characteristics strongly differentiate 
between subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups and have been shown to impact on the 
survival probability of start-ups (e.g., Cooper et al., 1994). Since ordinary least squares 
regression models cannot reveal any further determinants of credit rating that distinguish 
between subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups, the propensity score model is estimated with 




Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 083The propensity to receive subsidies is estimated with a logit model (Table A1). In accordance 
with the discussion above, the selected variables for each of the two models are regressed on 
the binary dependent variable Subsidy (i.e., take-up of financial subsidies within the first three 
business years). Since we are primarily interested in prediction and data reduction, 
redundancy and collinearity are of little account (Smith, 1997). However, this limits the 
interpretation of the coefficients, which are not further discussed here. 
 
  Employment growth    Credit rating—Survival   
Dependent variable: Subsidy       
Growth goals  -0.450    
Previous self-employment  -0.492   -0.479   
Initial capital  0.515 ***    0.397**   
Nace 2  1.827 ***    1.586**   
Nace 3  0.469   0.248   
Nace 7  0.975 **    0.912*   
Constant  -2.113 ***    -1.851**   
N  159   125  
LR chi2 (k)  (6) 27.54   (5) 16.28   
Prob > LR  0.0001   0.0061  
McFadden’s R2  0.1263   0.0943  
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01  
Table A1: Estimation of the propensity score 
                                                                                                                                                         
17 This approach follows Rubin and Thomas (1996, p. 253), who recommend including a variable in doubt 
“unless […] it can be excluded because there is a consensus that it is unrelated to the outcome variables or not a 
proper covariate”. 
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The common support condition ensures that any set of characteristics of subsidized start-ups 
(captured by the propensity score) can also be observed for nonsubsidized ones. The kernel 
density functions (Figure B1) illustrate the distribution of the propensity score for subsidized 
and nonsubsidized start-ups.
18 The region of common support is found in the overlap and 
requires discarding 11 (4) observations from the analysis of employment growth (credit 
rating). 




















































Nonsubsidized start-ups  Subsidized start-ups
Please note: Observations inside the region of common support lie within the black box. All observations outside the box 
are excluded from matching. 
Figure B1: Distribution of the propensity score: employment growth (top), credit rating (bottom) 
 
                                                 
18 The kernel density estimate is calculated using a Gaussian kernel function. The bandwidth is specified by 
Stata, using the kdensity function. 
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T-tests for equality of means in the subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups indicate the 
balancing of the variables before and after matching (Table C1). 
Employment growth  Credit rating  Before matching 
After matching  After matching 
Mean of…  Mean of matched…  Mean of matched… 
… subsidized 





















N = 70    N = 89  N = 66 
 
N = 84  N = 54    N = 67 
  0.61  0.62  0.52 0.58  0.56  0.57  Novelty 
  0.57  0.62  0.55 0.59  0.52  0.66  Growth goals 
  0.73  0.67  0.73 0.63  0.74    0.69  University degree 
  0.31  0.45  0.34 0.37  0.35    0.39  Previous self-
employment 
  0.69  0.63  0.70 0.61  0.67    0.61  Team start-up 
  3.47  2.89  3.20 3.21  3.28    3.35  Initial capital 
  0.37  0.49  0.34 0.50  0.37  0.48  Year 1994–1997 
  0.39  0.35  0.41 0.34  0.43    0.35  Year 1998–2001 
  0.24  0.16  0.25 0.16  0.20    0.17  Year 2002–2006 
  0.27  0.08  0.20 0.19  0.20    0.18  Nace 2 
  0.19  0.20  0.20 0.21  0.20    0.21  Nace 3 
  0.36  0.30  0.39 0.39  0.39    0.38  Nace 7 
  0.19  0.42  0.20 0.21  0.20    0.23  Nace x 
 
 
  0.96  0.83  0.95 0.61  0.97    0.60  Employment 
growth 
  298.16  292.15  303.97 283.41  302.63  291.45  Rating 
 






  0.53  0.41  -  -  0.50  0.49 
Please note: The balancing of the variables is shown after kernel matching with the optimal bandwidth. Bold numbers 
indicate significant different means between observation from subsidized start-ups and nonsubsidized start-ups before and 
after matching in a two-sided t-test (10% significance level). Because of the imposition of the common support (see 
Appendix B), the matched samples have fewer observations. 
Table C1: Group differences between subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups before and after matching 
 
After matching, subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups differ only with respect to Year 1994–
1997 in the analysis of employment growth. This should not be of concern since there is no 
evidence that this variable impacts on employment growth. 
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